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This article attempts to investigate how much of phonology can be 
explained by properties of general cognition and the Sensorimotor system — 
in other words, third-factor principles, in support of the evolutionary 
scenario posed by Hauser et al. (2002a). It argues against Pinker & 
Jackendoff’s (2005: 212) claim that “major characteristics of phonology are 
specific to language (or to language & music), [and] uniquely human,” and 
their conclusion that “phonology represents a major counterexample to the 
recursion-only hypothesis.” Contrary to the statements by Anderson (2004) 
and Yip (2006a, 2006b) to the effect that phonology has not been tested in 
animals, it is shown that virtually all the abilities that underlie phonological 
competence have been shown in other species.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The present work is a preliminary attempt to determine how much of human 
phonological computation (i.e., representations and operations) can be attributed 
to mechanisms which are present in other cognitive areas and in other species. In 
other words, I explore the idea advanced in many recent Minimalist writings that 
phonology is an ‘ancillary’ module, and that phonological systems are “doing the 
best they can to satisfy the problem they face: To map to the [Sensorimotor 
system] interface syntactic objects generated by computations that are ‘well-
designed’ to satisfy [Conceptual-Intentional system] conditions” but unsuited to 
communicative purposes (Chomsky 2008: 136). Phonology is on this view an 
afterthought, an externalization system applied to an already fully-functional 
internal language system. While some (e.g., Mobbs 2008) have taken this to 
suggest that phonology might be messy, and that we should not expect to find 
evidence of ‘good design’ in it, there is another perspective which suggests 
instead that the opposite conclusion is warranted: Even if the Conceptual-
Intentional interface is more transparent than the Sensorimotor one, phonology                                                         
     I wish to thank Cedric Boeckx, Marc Hauser, Ansgar Endress, Terje Lohndal, two 
anonymous reviewers, and audiences at the Harvard Mind, Brain & Behavior Initiative 
Colloquium and BALE 2008 at York University for their helpful comments. All faults remain 
my own. 
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might nevertheless be much simpler (less domain-specific) than has previously 
been thought, making use of only abilities that already found applications in 
other cognitive domains at the time externalized language emerged.  
 This view accords with the evolutionary scenario developed by Hauser et 
al. (2002a) and Fitch et al. (2005), who suggest that language may have emerged 
suddenly as a result of minimal genetic changes with far-reaching consequences 
(cf. Pinker & Jackendoff 2005 and Jackendoff & Pinker 2005, who see language as 
manifesting complex design).1 Particularly relevant is the distinction that Hauser 
et al. (2002a) make between the ‘Faculty of Language – Broad Sense’ (FLB), 
including all the systems that are recruited for language but need not be unique 
to language, or to humans, and the ‘Faculty of Language – Narrow Sense’ (FLN), 
which is the subset of FLB that is unique to our species and to language. At 
present, the leading hypothesis among proponents of this view is that FLN is 
very small, perhaps consisting only of some type of recursion (i.e., Merge) and/ 
or lexicalization2 plus the mappings from narrow syntax to the interfaces. Pinker 
& Jackendoff (2005: 212) claim that phonology constitutes a problematic 
counterexample to this hypothesis because “major characteristics of phonology 
are specific to language (or to language & music), [and] uniquely human.” In this 
article, I investigate the extent to which Pinker & Jackendoff’s criticism is viable, 
first by examining what abilities animals have which are relevant to phonology, 
and then by sketching out an account which I develop more fully elsewhere 
(Samuels 2009a), which I argue is consistent with the view that FLN is quite 
limited.  
 
 
2. What Does Phonology Require? 
 
Few authors have discussed phonology as it pertains to the FLN/FLB distinction. 
For example, Hauser et al. (2002a: 1573) list a number of approaches to investi-
gating the Sensorimotor system’s properties (shown below in (1)), and these are 
all taken to fall outside FLN. However, none of these pertain directly to phono-
logical computation.  
 
(1) a.  vocal imitation and invention  
   Tutoring studies of songbirds, analyses of vocal dialects in whales, 
spontaneous imitation of artificially created sounds in dolphins  
                                                        
    1 The relation of Hauser et al.’s claims to the Minimalist Program is somewhat controversial, 
and the authors themselves claim that the two are independent. At least from my personal 
perspective, they are two sides of the same coin.  
    2 Hauser et al. focused on the idea that recursion might be the crucial component in FLN. 
However, it has proven difficult to pinpoint what is meant by recursion in the relevant 
sense, such that it may be unique to humans and to language. Another hypothesis to which I 
am sympathetic has been proposed by authors such as Spelke (2003) and Boeckx (in press). 
On their view, it is not recursion but rather lexicalization — the ability to embed any 
concept in a ‘lexical envelope’ which allows it to be recursively Merged — which arose 
uniquely in our species. For the purposes of the present inquiry, we may simply note that 
both of these hypotheses exclude phonology from FLN.  
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 b. neurophysiology of action-perception systems  
   Studies assessing whether mirror neurons, which provide a core 
substrate for the action-perception system, may subserve gestural 
and (possibly) vocal imitation  
 c.  discriminating the sound patterns of language  
   Operant conditioning studies of the prototype magnet effect in 
macaques and starlings  
 d.  constraints imposed by vocal tract anatomy  
   Studies of vocal tract length and formant dispersion in birds and 
primates  
 e.  biomechanics of sound production  
   Studies of primate vocal production, including the role of mandibular 
oscillations  
 f.  modalities of language production and perception  
   Cross-modal perception and sign language in humans versus 
unimodal communication in animals  
 
While these are all issues which undoubtedly deserve attention, they address two 
areas — how auditory categories are learned, and how speech is produced — 
which are peripheral to the core of phonological computation. Nevertheless, (1c) 
and (1f), which I discuss in Samuels (2009a: sect. 3.2.1), are particularly inter-
esting. These are relevant to questions of phonological acquisition and the 
building of phonological categories, including the possibility that phonological 
features are emergent rather than innate (see Mielke 2008). And the instinct to 
imitate, addressed in (1a) and (1b), is clearly necessary to language acquisition. 
However, I leave these items out of the present discussion because neither these 
nor any of the other items in (1) have the potential to address how phonological 
objects are represented or manipulated, particularly in light of the substance-free 
approach to phonology I adopt (see Hale & Reiss 2000a, 2000b, 2008), which 
renders questions about the articulators (e.g., (1d–e)) moot since their properties 
are totally incidental and invisible to the phonological system.  
 Two papers by Yip (2006a, 2006b) outline a more directly relevant set of 
research aims. She suggests that, if we are to understand whether ‘animal phono-
logy’ is possible, we should investigate whether other species are capable of the 
following:3 
 
(2) a.  Grouping by natural classes  
 b.  Grouping sounds into syllables, feet, words, phrases  
 c.  Calculating statistical distributions from transitional probabilities  
 d. Learning arbitrary patterns of distribution  
 e.  Learning/producing rule-governed alternations  
 f.  Computing identity (total, partial, adjacent, non-adjacent)                                                         
    3 Yip mentions two additional items which also appear on Hauser et al.’s list: Categorical 
perception/perceptual magnet effects and accurate production of sounds (mimicry).  
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This list can be divided roughly into three parts (with some overlap): (2a–b) are 
concerned with how representations are organized, (2c–d) are concerned with 
how we arrive at generalizations about the representations, and (2e–f) are 
concerned with the operations that are used to manipulate the representations. I 
would add three more areas to investigate in non-linguistic domains and in other 
species:  
 
(2)  g.  Exhibiting preferences for contrast/rhythmicity 
 h.  Performing numerical calculations (parallel individuation and ratio  
  comparison)  
 i.  Using computational operations: search, copy, concatenate, delete  
 
 In the sections to follow, I will present evidence that a wide range of animal 
species are capable of the tasks in (2a–i), though it may be the case that there is no 
single species (except ours) in which all these abilities cluster in exactly this 
configuration — in other words, it may be that what underlies human phonology 
is a unique combination of abilities, but the individual abilities themselves may be 
found in many other species. I show (contra Yip) that there is already a 
substantial amount of literature demonstrating this, and that it is reasonable to 
conclude on this basis that no part of phonology, as conceived in my ongoing 
work, is part of FLN. In section 3, I focus on the abilities which underlie (2a,b,h) 
— that is, how phonological material is grouped. Next, in section 4, I turn to (2c-
g), or the ability to identify and produce patterns. Finally, in section 5, I discuss 
(2e,i), the abilities which have to do with symbolic computation. 
 Before turning to these tasks, though, I would like to address one major 
concern which might be expressed about the discussion to follow. This concern 
could be phrased as follows: how do we know that the animal abilities for which 
I provide evidence are truly comparable to the representations and operations 
found in human phonology, and what if these abilities are only analogous, not 
homologous? Admittedly, it is probably premature to answer these questions for 
most of the abilities we will be considering. But even if we discover that the traits 
under consideration are indeed analogous, all is not lost by any means. In 
connection with this, I would like to highlight the following statement from 
Hauser et al. (2002a: 1572):  
 
Despite the crucial role of homology in comparative biology, homologous 
traits are not the only relevant source of evolutionary data. The convergent 
evolution of similar characters in two independent clades, termed 
‘analogies’ or ‘homoplasies,’ can be equally revealing [(Gould 1976)]. The 
remarkably similar (but non-homologous) structures of human and octopus 
eyes reveal the stringent constraints placed by the laws of optics and the 
contingencies of development on an organ capable of focusing a sharp 
image onto a sheet of receptors. […] Furthermore, the discovery that 
remarkably conservative genetic cascades underlie the development of such 
analogous structures provides important insights into the ways in which 
developmental mechanisms can channel evolution [(Gehring 1998)]. Thus, 
although potentially misleading for taxonomists, analogies provide critical 
data about adaptation under physical and developmental constraints. 
Casting the comparative net more broadly, therefore, will most likely reveal 
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larger regularities in evolution, helping to address the role of such 
constraints in the evolution of language. 
 
 In other words, analogs serve to highlight ‘third-factor’ principles — that is, 
general properties of biological/physical design (Chomsky 2005, 2007) — which 
might be at play, and help us to identify the set of constraints which are relevant 
to the evolutionary history of the processes under investigation. For example, 
both human infants and young songbirds undergo a babbling phase in the course 
of the development of their vocalizations. Even though we do not want to claim 
that the mechanisms responsible for babbling in the two clades are homologous, 
nevertheless: 
 
[T]heir core components share a deeply conserved neural and 
developmental foundation: Most aspects of neurophysiology and 
development — including regulatory and structural genes, as well as neuron 
types and neurotransmitters — are shared among vertebrates. That such 
close parallels have evolved suggests the existence of important constraints 
on how vertebrate brains can acquire large vocabularies of complex, learned 
sounds. Such constraints may essentially force natural selection to come up 
with the same solution repeatedly when confronted with similar problems. 
(Hauser et al. 2002a: 1572) 
 
 We may not know what those constraints are yet, but until we identify the 
homologies and analogies between the mechanisms which underlie human and 
animal cognition, we cannot even begin to tackle the interesting set of questions 
which arises regarding the constraints on cognitive evolution. The present study, 
then, provides a place for us to begin this investigation in the domain of human 
phonological computation. I also want to emphasize that the components of 
phonology in (1)–(2) are intended to be as theory-neutral as possible, though in 
section 6 I give a brief overview of Samuels (2009a), a theory which I argue is 
especially well-suited to Hauser et al.’s hypotheses regarding the evolution of 
language, and also congenial to the Minimalist conception of the architecture of 
grammar. Furthermore, the basic argument I present against Pinker & Jackendoff 
— namely, that phonology does not constitute a major problem for Hauser et al. 
or for the Minimalist Program — can certainly hold even if one does not adopt 
my particular view of phonology. 
 
 
3.  Grouping 
 
Since the hypothesis put forward by Hauser et al. (2002a) takes recursion to be 
the central property of FLN (along with the mappings from narrow syntax to the 
conceptual-intentional and Sensorimotor interfaces), much attention has been 
paid to groupings, particularly recursive ones, in language. While phonology is 
widely considered to be free of recursion,4 nevertheless grouping (of features, of                                                         
    4  Some authors have argued for recursion in the higher levels of the prosodic hierarchy (e.g., 
at the Prosodic Word level or above). See Truckenbrodt (1995) for a representative proposal 
concerning recursion at the Phonological Phrase level. Even if this is correct (though see 
Samuels 2009a: chap. 5), the recursive groupings in question are mapped from syntactic 
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segments, and of larger strings) is an integral part of phonology, and there is 
evidence that infants perform grouping or ‘chunking’ in non-linguistic domains 
as well; see Feigenson & Halberda (2004). Additionally, segmenting the speech 
stream into words or morphemes (or syllables) also depends on what is 
essentially the converse of grouping, namely edge detection. We will discuss 
edge detection and the extraction of other patterns in section 4.  
 Human beings are masters at grouping, and at making inductive 
generalizations. Cheney & Seyfarth (2007: 118) write that “the tendency to chunk 
is so pervasive that human subjects will work to discover an underlying rule 
even when the experimenter has — perversely — made sure there is none.” This 
holds true across the board, not just for linguistic patterns. With respect to other 
species, many studies beginning with Kuhl & Miller (1975) show that mammals 
(who largely share our auditory system) are sensitive to the many of the same 
acoustic parameters as define phonemic categories in human language (see 
further discussion in Samuels 2009a: sect. 3.2). Experiments of this type provide 
the most direct comparanda to the groupings found in phonology. Even from a 
substance-free perspective, such results are valuable because they shed light on 
the origins of biases in phonetic perception which give rise to phonological 
patterns (see Blevins 2004 and Samuels 2009a: chap. 2 for an explicit connection 
to the substance-free program). 
  Also, relevantly to the processing of tone and prosody, we know that 
rhesus monkeys are sensitive to pitch classes — they, like us, treat a melody 
which is transposed by one or two octaves to be more similar to the original than 
one which is transposed by a different interval (Wright et al. 2000). They can also 
distinguish rising pitch contours from falling ones, which is an ability required to 
perceive pitch accent, lexical tone, and intonational patterns in human speech 
(Brosch et al. 2004). However, animals are generally more sensitive to absolute 
pitch than they are to relative pitch; the opposite is true for humans (see Patel 
2008).  
 Another way of approaching the question of whether animals can group 
sensory stimuli in ways that are relevant to phonology is to see whether their 
own vocalizations contain internal structure. The organization of bird song is 
particularly clear, though it is not obvious exactly whether/how analogies to 
human language should be made. Yip (2006a) discusses how zebra finch songs 
are structured, building on work by Doupe & Kuhl (1999) and others. The songs 
of many passerine songbirds consist of a sequence of one to three notes (or 
‘songemes’ as Coen (2006) calls them) arranged into a ‘syllable’. The syllables, 
which can be up to one second in length, are organized into motifs which Yip 
considers to be equivalent to prosodic words but others equate with phrases, and 
there are multiple motifs within a single song. The structure can be represented 
graphically as follows, where M stands for motif, σ stands for syllable, and n 
stands for note (modified from Yip 2006a):                                                                                                                                                          
structure, and are therefore not created by the phonological system alone. As an anonymous 
reviewer notes, this type of recursive structure is also quite different from the type found in 
syntax (for example, sentential embedding) which is limited in its depth only by perfor-
mance factors.  
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(3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 There are a few important differences between this birdsong structure and 
those found in human phonology, some of which are not apparent from the 
diagram. First, as Yip points out, there is no evidence for binary branching in this 
structure, which suggests that the combinatory mechanism used by birds cannot 
be equated with binary Merge, but it could be more along the lines of adjunction 
or concatenation, which creates a flat structure; see section 6 and Samuels & 
Boeckx (2009). Second, the definition of a ‘syllable’ in birdsong is a series of 
notes/songemes bordered by silence (Williams & Staples 1992, Coen 2006). This 
is very unlike syllables, or indeed any other phonological categories, in human 
language. Third, the examples from numerous species in Slater (2000) show that 
the motif is typically a domain of repetition (as I have represented it above); the 
shape of a song is ((ax)(by)(cz))w with a string of syllables a, b, c repeated in order. 
This is quite reminiscent of reduplication. Payne (2000) shows that virtually the 
same can be said of humpback whale songs, which take the shape (a … n)w, 
where the number of repeated components, n, can be up to around ten.  
 Both birdsong and whalesong structures are ‘flat’ (in the sense of Neeleman 
& van de Koot 2006) or ‘linearly hierarchical’ (in the sense of Cheney & Seyfarth 
2007) — they have a depth of embedding which is limited to a one-dimensional 
string which as been delimited intro groups, as in (4) — exactly what I argue in 
section 6 and in Samuels (2009a) for human phonology. It is interesting to note in 
conjunction with this observation that baboon social knowledge is of exactly this 
type, as Cheney & Seyfarth have described. Baboons within a single tribe (of up 
to about eighty individuals) obey a strict, transitive dominance hierarchy. But 
this hierarchy is divided by matrilines; individuals from a single matriline 
occupy adjacent spots in the hierarchy, with mothers, daughters, and sisters from 
the matriline next to one another. So an abstract representation of their linear 
dominance hierarchy would look something like this, with each x representing an 
individual and parentheses defining matrilines:  
 
(4) (xxx)(xx)(xxxx)(xxx)(xxxxxxx)(xxx)(x)(xxxx) 
 
 The difference between the baboon social hierarchy and birdsong, which I 
translate into this sort of notation below, is merely the repetition which creates a 
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motif (think of baboon individuals as corresponding to songemes and matrili-
nesas corresponding to syllables):  
 
(5)  
 
 
 
 There is evidence to suggest that, as in phonology (but strikingly unlike 
narrow syntax), the amount of hierarchy capable of being represented by animals 
is quite limited. In the wild, apes and monkeys very seldom spontaneously 
perform actions which are hierarchically structured with sub-goals and sub-
routines, and this is true even when attempts are made to train them to do so. 
Byrne (2007) notes one notable exception, namely the food processing techniques 
of gorillas. Byrne provides a flow chart detailing a routine, complete with several 
decision points and optional steps, which mountain gorillas use to harvest and 
eat nettle leaves. This routine comprises a minimum of five steps, and Byrne 
reports that the routines used to process other foods are of similar complexity. 
Byrne further notes that “all genera of great apes acquire feeding skills that are 
flexible and have syntax-like organisation, with hierarchical structure. […] 
Perhaps, then, the precursors of linguistic syntax should be sought in primate 
manual abilities rather than in their vocal skills” (Byrne 2007: 12; emphasis his). I 
concur that manual routines provide an interesting source of comparanda for the 
syntax of human language, broadly construed (i.e., including the syntax of 
phonology). Fujita (2007) has suggested along these lines the possibility that 
Merge evolved from an ‘action grammar’ of the type which would underlie apes’ 
foraging routines. 
 Other experiments suggest that non-human primates may be limited in the 
complexity of their routines in interesting ways. For example, Johnson–Pynn et al. 
(1999) used bonobos, capuchin monkeys, and chimpanzees in a study similar to 
one done on human children by Greenfield et al. (1972) (see also discussion of 
these two studies by Conway & Christiansen 2001). These experiments investi-
gated how the subjects manipulated a set of three nesting cups (call them A, B, C 
in increasing order of size). The subjects’ actions were categorized as belonging to 
the ‘pairing,’ ’pot,’ or ’subassembly’ strategies, which exhibit varying degrees of 
embedding:5 
 
(6) a.  Pairing strategy: place cup B into cup C. Ignore cup A.  
 b.  Pot strategy: first, place cup B into cup C. Then place cup A into cup B.  
 c.  Subassembly strategy: first, place cup A into cup B. Then place cup B 
into cup C.  
                                                         
    5 The situation is actually substantially more complicated than this, because the subjects need 
not put the cups in the nesting order. To give a couple examples, putting cup A into cup C 
counts as the pairing strategy; putting cup A into cup C and then placing cup B on top 
counts as the pot strategy. I refer the reader to the original studies for explanations of each 
possible scenario. The differences between the strategies as I have described them in the 
main text suffice for present purposes. 
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 The pairing strategy is the simplest, requiring only a single step. This was 
the predominant strategy for human children up to twelve months of age, and 
for all the other primates — but the capuchins required watching the human 
model play with the cups before they produced even this kind of combination. 
The pot strategy requires two steps, but it is simpler than the subassembly 
strategy in that the latter, but not the former, requires treating the combination of 
cups A + B as a unit in the second step. (We might consider the construction of 
the A + B unit as being parallel to how complex specifiers and adjuncts are 
composed ‘in a separate derivational workspace’ in the syntax; see Fujita 2007.) 
Human children use the pot strategy as early as eleven months (the youngest age 
tested) and begin to incorporate the subassembly strategy at about twenty 
months. In stark contrast, the non-human primates continued to prefer the 
pairing strategy, and when they stacked all three cups, they still relied on the pot 
strategy even though the experimenter demonstrated only the subassembly 
strategy for them. Though we should be careful not to discount the possibility 
that different experimental methodologies or the laboratory context is respon-
sible for the non-humans’ performance, rather than genuine cognitive limitations, 
the results are consistent with the hypothesis that humans have the ability to 
represent deeper hierarchies than other primates. This is, of course, what we 
predict if only humans are endowed with the recursive engine that allows for 
infinite syntactic embedding (Hauser et al. 2002a).  
 Many other types of experimental studies have also been used to 
investigate how animals group objects. It is well known that a wide variety of 
animals, including rhesus monkeys, have the ability to perform comparisons of 
analog magnitude with small numbers (<4). They can discriminate between, for 
instance, groups of two and three objects, and pick the group with more objects 
in it. As Hauser et al. (2000) note, such tasks require the animal to group the 
objects into distinct sets, then compare the cardinality of those sets. Further data 
comes from Schusterman & Kastak (1993), who taught a California sea lion 
named Rio to associate arbitrary visual stimuli (cards with silhouettes of various 
objects printed on them). On the basis of being taught to select card B when 
presented with card A, and also to select card C when presented with card B, Rio 
transitively learned the A-C association.6 Rio also made symmetric associations: 
when presented with B, she would select A, and so forth. We might consider 
these groups Rio learned to be akin to learning arbitrary pairings such as which 
phonemes participate in a given alternation (A and C bear the same relation to B), 
or in which contexts a particular process occurs (choose A in the context of B; 
choose B in the context of C). 
 The concept of ‘natural classes’ has also been studied in animals to a certain 
degree, though not in those terms. We can think of natural classes as multiple 
ways of grouping the same objects into sets according to their different properties 
(i.e., features). Alex the parrot had this skill: He could sort objects by color, shape, 
or material (reported by his trainer in Smith 1999). As regards the ability to group                                                         
    6  See also Addessi et al. (2008) on transitive symbolic representation in capuchin monkeys, 
and Cheney & Seyfarth (2007) on transitive inference involving social hierarchy in baboons. 
Cheney & Seyfarth also discuss both transitive social dominance and learning of symbolic 
representations in pinyon jays. 
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objects, then, I conclude that animals — especially birds and primates — are 
capable of the basic grouping abilities which phonology requires. They perceive 
(some) sounds categorically like we do; their vocalizations show linearly 
hierarchical groupings like ours; they can assign objects arbitrarily to sets like we 
do; they can categorize objects into overlapping sets according to different 
attributes like we do. Their main limitations seem to be in the area of higher-
degree embedding, but this is (i) at best, a property of phonology which arises 
because of recursion in syntax, not from a recursive engine within phonology (or, 
if Samuels 2009a is correct to eliminate the prosodic hierarchy, not a property of 
phonology at all) and (ii) an expected result if, as Hauser et al. (2002a) hypothe-
size, recursion is a part of FLN and therefore not shared with other species.7 
 
 
4. Patterns 
 
The next set of abilities we will consider are those which deal with extracting pat-
terns from a data stream and/or learning arbitrary associations. As I mentioned 
in the previous section, I view pattern-detection as the flipside of grouping: A 
pattern is essentially a relation between multiple groups, or different objects 
within the same group. Thus, the ability to assign objects to a set or an equiva-
lence class is a prerequisite for finding any patterns in which those objects partici-
pate; the abilities discussed in the previous section are very much relevant to this 
one as well.  
 Several experimental studies on animal cognition more generally bear on 
the issue of abstract pattern learning. One such study, undertaken by Hauser et 
al. (2002b), tested whether tamarins could extract simple patterns (‘algebraic 
rules’) like same–different–different (ABB) or same–same–different (AAB) from a 
speech stream. They performed an experiment very similar to one run on infants 
by Marcus et al. (1999). The auditory stimuli in both of these studies were of the 
form C1V1C1V1C2V2 (the AAB condition) or C1V1C2V2C2V2 (the ABB condition), 
such as li–li–wi or le–we–we. After habituating the infants/tamarins to one of 
these conditions, they tested them on two novel test items: one from the same 
class to which they had been habituated, and a second from the other class. The 
item with a different pattern than the habituated class should provoke a dishabi-
tuation response if the subjects succeed in learning the appropriate generalization 
based on the pattern in the stimuli presented during the training phase. Both 
infants and tamarins evidenced learning of these simple patterns; they were more 
likely to dishabituate to the item with the new pattern.                                                          
    7 A reviewer asks whether this implies animals have ‘a little’ recursion, and what that would 
even mean. I view the situation as an exact parallel to the difference between humans and 
animals in the domain of numerical cognition; perhaps the two dichotomies are indeed 
manifestations of the same cognitive difference, namely that only humans have a recursive 
engine (Merge), as suggested by Hauser et al. (2002a). While many animals (and young 
human children) seem to be able to represent small numerals, only suitably mature (and, 
perhaps, suitably linguistic) humans go on to learn the inductive principle, which allows 
them to count infinitely high. See discussion later in this section and section 5 for more 
discussion and references on numeracy in animals. 
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 This type of pattern-extraction ability could serve phonology in several 
ways, such as the learning of phonological rules or phonotactic generalizations. 
Heinz (2007) showed that phonotactics (restrictions on the co-occurrence of 
segments, such as at the beginnings or ends of words) can be captured without 
any exceptions if three segments at a time are taken into account, so it seems on 
the basis of tamarins’ success in the Hauser et al. experiment that learning phono-
tactics would not be out of their range of capabilities (though as we will soon see, 
tamarins may have independent problems with consonantal sounds that would 
interfere with this potential). Furthermore, phonotactics (and all attested phono-
logical rules) can be modeled with finite-state grammars, as has been known 
since Johnson (1970). Here the somewhat controversial findings of Fitch & 
Hauser (2004) may also be relevant. At least under one interpretation of the data 
obtained by Fitch & Hauser, tamarins succeed at learning finite-state grammars 
but fail to learn more complicated phrase-structure grammars. If we accept these 
conclusions, then in theory — problems with consonants notwithstanding — we 
would expect that tamarins could learn any attested phonotactic restriction or 
phonological rule.  
 One of the most important obstacles facing a language learner/user falls 
into the category of pattern-extraction. This difficult task is parsing the continu-
ous speech stream into discrete units (be they phrases, words, syllables, or 
segments). This speaks directly to (2b–c). Obviously, segmenting speech requires 
some mechanism for detecting the edges of these units. Since the 1950s, it has 
been recognized that one way to detect the edges of words is to track transitional 
probabilities, usually between syllables. If Pr(AB) is the probability of syllable B 
following syllable A, and P(A) is the frequency of A, then the transitional 
probability between A and B can be represented as:  
 
(7)  
 
 The transitional probabilities within words are typically greater than those 
across word boundaries, so the task of finding word boundaries reduces to 
finding the local minima in the transitional probabilities. Numerous experimental 
studies suggest that infants do in fact utilize this strategy (among others) to help 
them parse the speech stream, and that statistical learning is not unique to the 
linguistic domain but is also utilized in other areas of cognition (see references in 
Gambell & Yang (2005)). With respect to the availability of this strategy in non-
humans, Hauser et al. (2001) found that tamarins are able to segment a 
continuous stream of speech into three-syllable CVCVCV ‘words’ based solely on 
the transitional probabilities between the syllables. Rats are also sensitive to local 
minima in transitional probabilities (Toro et al. 2005).  
 While transitional probabilities between syllables are strictly local calcu-
lations (i.e., they involve adjacent units), some phonological (and syntactic) 
dependencies are non-adjacent. This is the case with vowel harmony, for 
instance, and is also relevant to languages with ‘templatic’ morphology, such as 
Arabic, in which a triconsonantal root is meshed with a different group of vowels 
depending on the part of speech which the root instantiates in a particular 
context. Comparing the results obtained by Newport & Aslin (2004) and 
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Newport et al. (2004) provides an extremely interesting contrast between human 
and tamarin learning of such patterns. Newport et al. tested adult humans and 
cotton-top tamarins on learning artificial languages, all with three-syllable 
CVCVCV words, involving the three different kinds of non-adjacent depen-
dencies which I list below.  
 
(8)  a.  Non-adjacent syllables: the third syllable of each word was predictable 
on the basis of the first, but the second syllable varied.  
 b. Non-adjacent consonants: The second and third consonants of each 
word were predictable on the basis of the first, but the vowels varied.  
 c.  Non-adjacent vowels: The second and third vowels of each word were 
predictable on the basis of the first, but the consonants varied.  
 
 Both humans and tamarins succeeded at learning the languages tested in 
the non-adjacent vowel condition. Humans also succeeded at the non-adjacent 
consonant condition. These results are expected, at least for the humans, because 
both of these types of dependencies are attested in natural language (in the 
guises of vowel harmony and templatic morphology, as already noted). Tamarins 
failed in the non-adjacent consonant condition, though this does not cast 
aspersions on the fact that they were able to learn non-adjacent dependencies; 
rather, it suggests that they have the cognitive capability needed to create the 
appropriate representations, but they might have difficulty distinguishing 
consonant sounds. In other words, their failure may not be due to the pattern-
detection mechanism, but rather due to the input which was available to that 
mechanism. This interpretation is supported by the fact that tamarins succeeded 
at establishing dependencies between non-adjacent syllables. 
 From a phonological perspective, perhaps the most intriguing result is that 
humans failed at this non-adjacent syllable condition. Newport et al. (2004: 111) 
ask:  
 
Why should non-adjacency — particularly syllable non-adjacency — be 
difficult for human listeners and relatively easy for tamarin monkeys? 
[…T]his is not likely to be because tamarins are in general more cognitively 
capable than adult humans. It must therefore be because human speech is 
processed in a different way by humans than by tamarins, and particularly 
in such a way that the computation of non-adjacent syllable regularities 
becomes more complex for human adults. 
 
 They go on to suggest that perhaps the syllable level is only indirectly 
accessible to humans because we primarily process speech in terms of segments 
(whereas tamarins process it in more holistic, longer chunks).8 This is a possible 
contributor to the observed effect, but other explanations are available. I will 
propose one here.  
 What I would like to suggest is that, in effect, tamarins fail to exhibit a                                                         
    8 Alternatively, Newport et al. suggest, it could be that tamarins’ shorter attention span 
reduces the amount of speech that they process at a given time; this would restrict their 
hypothesis space, making the detection of the syllable pattern easier. It is not obvious to me 
how this explains the tamarins’ pattern of performance across tasks, however.  
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minimality effect.9 Let us interpret the tamarins’ performance in the non-adjacent 
consonant condition as suggesting, as I did above, that they either (for whatever 
reason) ignore or simply do not perceive consonants. Then for them, the non-
adjacent syllable task differs minimally from the non-adjacent vowel task in that 
the former involves learning a pattern which skips the middle vowel. So rather 
than paying attention to co-occurrences between adjacent vowels, they have to 
look at co-occurrences between vowels which are one away from each other. It 
seems likely, as Newport et al. also suggest, that the adjacent vs. one-away 
difference represents only a small increase in cognitive demand. But for us, the 
non-adjacent syllable condition is crucially different — and this is true no matter 
whether we are actually paying attention to syllables, consonants, or vowels. 
These categories have no import for tamarins, but for humans, they are special. 
The dependency we seek in this condition is between two non-adjacent elements 
of the same category, which are separated by another instance of the same 
category. This is a classical minimality effect: if α, β, γ are of the same category 
and α≻β≻γ (≻ should be read for phonology as ‘precedes’ and for syntax, ‘c-
commands’), then no relationship between α and γ may be established. This 
restriction is captured straightforwardly if the way linguistic dependencies are 
established (be that dependency an instance of Agree, harmony, or whatever 
else) is established by means of a search procedure which scans from α segment 
by segment until it finds another instance of the same type (i.e., β), then stops and 
proceeds no further. If I am on the right track, then perhaps tamarins succeed 
where humans fail because their search mechanism does not work this way — 
which would be odd if minimality/locality restrictions arise from third-factor 
principles such as efficiency of computation — or more likely, that they do not 
represent the portions of the stimuli which they track as all belonging to the same 
abstract category of ‘vowel’ which is sufficient to trigger minimality effects for 
us.  
 A variety of other studies on primate cognition focus on the ability to learn 
sequences. Given that sequencing or precedence relationships are extremely 
important to language, particularly given the Minimalist emphasis on Merge in 
syntax and my parallel emphasis on concatenate in phonology, these studies are 
quite intriguing from a linguist’s perspective. One apparent cognitive limitation 
of non-human primates relative to our species in the domain of pattern-learning 
is that they have extreme difficulty with non-monotonic sequences. Conway & 
Christiansen (2001) report on a number of studies which compare primates’ 
performances on this kind of task. When presented with an ‘artificial fruit’ 
requiring four arbitrary actions to open it and thereby reveal a treat, chimpanzees 
and human preschoolers perform similarly; both succeed at learning the 
sequence.  
 However, another study highlights what seems to be a difference in the 
way humans and other primates plan and perform sequential actions. One                                                         
    9  Such effects have been discussed in terms of Relativized Minimality (Rizzi 1990) or the 
Minimal Link Condition (Chomsky 2000, 2004) in syntax and the No Line-Crossing 
Constraint (Goldsmith 1976) in auto-segmental phonology. I argue minimality in phonology 
and syntax emerges from the same underlying cause: A directional search mechanism 
which traverses strings of segments (see Mailhot & Reiss 2007, Samuels 2009a).  
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experiment undertaken by Ohshiba (1997) tested human adults, Japanese 
monkeys, and a chimpanzee on the ability to learn an arbitrary pattern: They 
were presented with a touch screen with four different-sized colored circles on it 
and had to touch each one in sequence to receive a reward; the circles disap-
peared when touched. All the species succeeded in learning a monotonic pattern: 
touch the circles in order from smallest to largest or largest to smallest. They also 
all succeeded, but were slower, at learning non-monotonic patterns.10 But as we 
will discuss in section 5, measurements of reaction times suggest the humans and 
monkeys used different strategies in planning which circles to touch.  
 Rhythm, too, is a type of pattern. Rhythmicity, cyclicity, and contrast are 
pervasive properties of language, particularly in phonology. Everything that has 
been attributed to the Obligatory Contour Principle (Leben 1973) fits into this 
category. Walter (2007) argues that these effects should be described not with a 
constraint against repetition (see also Reiss 2008), but as emerging from two 
major physical limitations: the difficulty of repeating a particular gesture in rapid 
succession, and the difficulty of perceiving similar sounds (or other sensory 
stimuli) distinctly in rapid succession. These are both extremely general pro-
perties of articulatory and perceptual systems which we have no reason to expect 
would be unique to language or to humans.  
 To date, perhaps the most direct cross-species test of the perception of 
human speech rhythm (prosody) comes from Ramus et al. (2000). In Ramus et al.’s 
experiment, human infants and cotton-top tamarins were tested on their ability 
to discriminate between Dutch and Japanese sentences under a number of 
conditions: one in which the sentences were played forward, one in which the 
sentences were played backward, and one in which the sentences were 
synthesized such that the phonemic inventory in each language was reduced to 
/s a l t n j/. The results of these experiments showed that both tamarins and 
human newborns were able to discriminate between these two unfamiliar and 
prosodically different languages in the forward-speech condition, but not in the 
backward-speech condition. A generous interpretation of these results would 
suggest “at least some aspects of human speech perception may have built upon 
preexisting sensitivities of the primate auditory system” (Ramus et al. 2000: 351). 
However, Werker & Voloumanos (2000) caution that we cannot conclude much 
about the processing mechanisms which serve these discrimination abilities; this 
is of particular concern given that the tamarins’ ability to tell Dutch and Japanese 
apart was reduced in the reduced phonemic inventory condition. This may 
indicate that tamarins rely more strongly on phonetic cues rather than prosodic 
ones. Given the apparent importance of prosody for syntactic acquisition in 
human children — specifically, babies seem to use prosodic information to help 
them set the head parameter — Kitahara (2003: 38) puts forth the idea that                                                         
    10  In some situations, non-human primates fail entirely at learning non-monotonic patterns. 
For example, Brannon & Terrace (1998, 2000) found that while rhesus macaques taught the 
first four steps in a monotonic pattern could spontaneously generalize to later steps, they 
failed to learn a four-member non-monotonic pattern even with extensive training. It is not 
clear what to attribute the worse performance in the Brannon & Terrace studies to; there are 
too many differences between the paradigm they used and the one reported in the main 
text, including the species tested. 
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“cotton-top tamarins fail to discriminate languages on the basis of their prosody 
alone, because syntactic resources that require such prosodic-sensitive system 
[sic] might not have evolved for them.” Though it is unclear how one might 
either support or disprove such a hypothesis, it is at the very least interesting to 
consider what prosody might mean for an animal which does not have the 
syntactic representations from which prosodic representations are built.  
 Another example of rhythmicity in speech is the wavelike sonority profile 
of our utterances, which is typically discussed in terms of syllable organization. 
Syllables range widely in shape across languages. In (9)–(10) I give examples 
from opposite ends of the spectrum: a series of three CV syllables in (9), and a 
syllable in (10) that has a branching onset as well as a coda, and additionally 
appendices on both ends. The relative heights of the segments in (9)–(10) repre-
sent an abstract scale of sonority (making no claim about the units of this scale).11 
 
(9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(10) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
All syllables, from CV (9) to CCCVCC (10), combine to yield a sonority profile 
roughly as in (11): 
 
(11)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The peaks and troughs may not be so evenly dispersed, and they may not 
all be of the same amplitudes, but the general shape is the same no matter 
whether the sonority values being plotted come from syllables that are CV, CVC, 
sCRV:CRs, and so forth, or any combination of these. This is hardly a new 
observation; it is over a century old (e.g., Lepsius & Whitney 1865, de Saussure                                                         
    11  I remain agnostic about the exact nature of sonority. However, see (among others) Ohala 
(1992) and Ohala & Kawasaki–Fukumori (1997) for arguments that it is a derived notion 
rather than a primitive one. 
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1916). Ohala& Kawasaki–Fukumori (1997: 356) point out that it is inevitable:  
 
Just by virtue of seeking detectable changes in the acoustic signal one would 
create as an epiphenomenon, i.e., automatically, a sequence showing local 
maxima and minima in vocal tract opening or loudness. In a similar way one 
could find ‘peaks’ (local maxima) in a string of random numbers as long as 
each succeeding number in the sequence was different from the preceding 
one. 
 
 I have suggested in previous work that the ability to break this wave up 
into periods (based partially on universal and partially on language-specific 
criteria) aids with the identification of word boundaries: they tend to fall at the 
local minima or maxima in the wave (Samuels 2009a: sect. 3.3). And as we saw 
earlier in this section, we already know that both human infants and tamarins are 
sensitive to local minima (of transitional probabilities) in speech, which I believe 
suggests that this is a legitimate possibility.12 
 Animals from a wide variety of clades show preferences for rhythmicity in 
their vocalizations and other behaviors as well, though it is important to note that 
our own (non-musical) speech has no regular beat; while language does have a 
rhythm, it is not a primitive (see discussion in Patel 2008). Yip (2006b) mentions 
that female crickets exhibit a preference for males who produce rhythmic calls, 
and Taylor et al. (2008) discovered that female frogs prefer rhythmic vocalizations 
as well. Rhythmic behaviors, or the ability to keep rhythm, appear to be 
widespread in the animal kingdom. Gibbons produce very rhythmic ‘great calls,’ 
and while Yip (2006b: 443) dismisses this, saying that “the illusion of rhythm is 
probably more related to breathing patterns than cognitive organization,” this 
should hardly disqualify the data. For example, the periodic modulation of 
sonority in our speech is closely connected to opening and closing cycle of the 
jaw (Redford 1999, Redford et al. 2001), and it is widely accepted that the gradual 
downtrend in pitch which human utterances exhibit has to do with our breathing 
patterns. So for humans, too, there is at least some purely physiological 
component; however, the fact that females of various species prefer rhythmic 
calls shows that at the very least, there is also a cognitive component to animals’ 
perception of rhythmicity. 
 There are also some animals which synchronize the rhythms produced by 
multiple individuals. For example, frogs, insects, and bonobos all synchronize 
their calls; some fireflies synchronize their flashing, and crabs synchronize their 
claw-waving (see Merker 2000 and references therein). However, while elephants 
can be taught to drum with better rhythmic regularity than human adults, they 
do not synchronize their drumming in an ensemble (Patel & Iversen 2006).  
 Finally, we should note that it is extremely common for animals to exhibit 
‘rule-governed’ behavior in the wild, and in their communicative behavior in 
particular. Cheney & Seyfarth (2007) make the case that baboon vocalizations are                                                         
    12  In all of the studies on tamarins (and human infants) of which I am aware, the shape of 
syllables tested does not extend beyond CV. As a reviewer suggests, it would be most 
informative to see studies which test a variety of syllable shapes — but note that tamarins’ 
difficulties with perceiving consonant sounds, as discussed earlier with regards to the 
Newport et al. (2004) experiments, would likely confound such investigations. 
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rule-governed in that they are directional and dependent on social standing. That 
is, a baboon will make different vocalizations to a higher-ranked member of the 
group than she will to a lower-ranked member. By this same rubric, vervet 
monkey grunts and chimpanzee calls should also be considered rule-governed; a 
number of articles on species ranging from treefrogs to dolphins to chickadees in 
a recent special issue of the Journal of Comparative Psychology (August 2008, vol. 
122.3) devoted to animal vocalizations further cement this point. And as we saw 
in the previous section, both bird and whale songs obey certain combinatorial 
rules — in other words, they have some kind of syntax (in the broad sense of the 
term). Here the distinction made by Anderson (2004) and suggested in earlier 
work by Peter Marler is useful: Plenty of animals have a ‘phonological’ syntax to 
their vocalizations, but only humans have a ‘semantic’ or ‘lexical’ syntax which is 
compositional and recursive in terms of its meaning. Again, this reiterates 
Hauser et al.’s view that what is special about human language is the mapping 
from syntax to the interfaces (and particularly the LF interface, as Chomsky 
emphasizes in recent writings; see, e.g., Chomsky 2004), not the externalization 
system.  
 
 
5. Operations 
 
The final set of abilities which we will discuss are those which pertain to the 
phonological operations for which I argue in Samuels (2009a): SEARCH and 
COPY.13 While these operations enjoy an elevated status in my work, as we will 
see in the next section, it is important to note that any theory of phonology, or of 
language in general, will have to make use of these operations. For example, 
Hornstein (2001) argues that insertion of an element into a linguistic derivation is 
copying from the lexicon, and I would add that it is very difficult to see how this 
copying might be done without a prior search into the lexicon. So, in short, one 
may contest my view that search, copy, and delete are the only operations in 
phonology, but it should not be seen as controversial that they play some role 
within the module. I also discuss here a fourth operation, concatenation. By this I 
mean the ability to connect morphemes — a root and an affix, for example — in a 
manner that creates a linear structure, not the nested hierarchical structure of 
Merge.14 This concatenation mechanism properly belongs to the syntax–phono-
logy interface, but since it operates at a stage at which phonological material has 
already been added (see Idsardi & Raimy, in press), as we know since some 
affixes are sensitive to phonological properties such as the stress pattern of the 
stem, it is relevant to the present work.                                                         
    13  I have little to say about the third operation which I posit, DELETE, but nothing suggests to 
me that this should be considered a domain-specific or species-specific ability.  
    14  Whereas iterative applications of concatenate yield a flat structure, iterative applications of 
Merge yield a nested hierarchical structure: syntactic structures must be flattened, whereas 
linear order is a primitive in phonology (Raimy 2000). Also, since phonology lacks Merge, it 
also follows that it lacks movement, since movement is a sub-species of Merge (Internal 
Merge or Re-Merge, Chomsky 2004). Without the possibility of re-merging the same 
element, the notion of identity is extrinsic in phonology, unlike in syntax (see Raimy 2003). 
Samuels & Boeckx (2009) discuss this issue in greater detail. 
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 Searching is ubiquitous in animal and human cognition. It is an integral 
part of foraging and hunting for food, to take but one example. The Ohshiba 
(1997) study of sequence-learning by monkeys, humans, and a chimpanzee is an 
excellent probe of searching abilities in primates because it shows that, while 
various species can perform the multiple sequential searches required to perform 
the experimental task (touching four symbols in an arbitrary order), they plan out 
the task in different ways. The humans were slow to touch the first circle but then 
touched the other three in rapid succession, as if they had planned the whole 
sequence before beginning their actions (the ‘collective search’ strategy). The 
monkeys, meanwhile, exhibited a gradual decrease in their reaction times. It was 
as if they planned only one step before executing it, then planned the next, and so 
forth (the ‘serial search’ strategy).  
 Perhaps most interestingly of all, the chimpanzee appeared to use the col-
lective search strategy on monotonic patterns but the serial search strategy when 
the sequence was not monotonic. That chimpanzees employ collective searches is 
corroborated by the results of a similar experiment by Biro & Matsuzawa (1999). 
The chimp in this study, Ai, had extensive experience with numerals, and she 
was required to touch three numerals on a touch-screen in monotonic order. 
Again, her reaction times were consistently fast after the initial step. But when 
the locations of the two remaining numerals were changed after she touched the 
first one, her reactions slowed, as if she had initially planned all three steps but 
her preparation was foiled by the switch. It is not clear to me exactly what should 
be concluded from the disparity between humans, chimps, and monkeys, but 
notice that the SEARCH mechanism proposed by Mailhot & Reiss (2007) and 
extended by Samuels (2009a, 2009b) operates in a manner consistent with the 
collective search strategy: scan the search space to find all targets of the operation 
to be performed, and then perform the operation to all targets in one fell swoop.  
 A close parallel to the COPY operation in phonology, particularly the copy-
ing of a string of segments as in reduplication, would be the patterns found in 
bird and whale songs. As we saw in section 3, Slater (2000) shows that for many 
bird species, songs take the shape ((ax)(by)(cz))w: That is, a string of syllables a, b, c, 
each of them repeated, and then the whole string repeated. We also saw that 
whale songs are similarly structured (Payne 2000). With respect to the copying of 
a feature from one segment to another (as in assimilatory processes), the relevant 
ability might be transferring a representation from long-term memory to short-
term memory: extracting a feature from a lexical representation and bringing it 
into the active phonological workspace. This seems like a pre-requisite for any 
task which involves the recall/use of memorized information, and perhaps can 
be seen as a virtual conceptual necessity arising from computational efficiency (a 
prime source of third-factor explanation; see Chomsky 2005, 2007).15 
 As I mentioned in the previous two sections, concatenation serves both the                                                         
    15  If we think of copying as including imitative or mimicking behaviors, then this, too, is a 
very common ability. However, as Hauser (1996) stresses, monkeys and apes are not very 
strong vocal learners, as opposed to songbirds and cetaceans, which are quite skilled in this 
area. Nevertheless, monkeys’ learning is facilitated by watching a demonstration (Cheney & 
Seyfarth 2007), and Arbib (2005) argues that chimpanzees have the capacity for simple 
imitation that monkeys lack; humans have the capacity for complex imitation chimps lack. 
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ability to group and the ability to perform sequential actions. Without the ability 
to assign objects to sets or combine multiple steps into a larger routine, neither of 
these are possible. We have already seen that bird and whale songs have the kind 
of sequential organization which is indicative of concatenated chunks, and 
primates can perform multi-step actions with sub-goals.  
 I would like to suggest that concatenation may underlie the ‘number sense’ 
common to humans and many other species as well (for an overview, see 
Dehaene 1997, Lakoff & Nuñez 2001, Devlin 2005). This is perhaps clearest in the 
case of parallel individuation/tracking, or the ability to represent in memory a 
small number of discrete objects (< 4; see Hauser et al. 2000 and references 
therein). Shettleworth (1998) provides an overview of animal abilities in this 
domain, which have been shown for species as diverse as parrots and rats.  
 The idea that there is a connection between parallel individuation and 
concatenation is suggested by the fact that the speed of recognizing the number 
of objects in a scene decreases with each additional object that is presented within  
the range of capability (Saltzman & Garner 1948). This leads me to suspect, along 
with Gelman & Gallistel (1978) (but contra Dehaene) that such tasks require 
paying attention to each object in the array separately, albeit briefly. Lakoff & 
Nuñez (2001) also discuss a number of studies showing that chimpanzees (most 
notably Ai, whom we met previously as the subject of Biro & Matsuzawa’s 1999 
study), when given rigorous training over a long period of time, can engage in 
basic counting, addition, and subtraction of natural numbers up to about ten. 
These tasks clearly involve the assignment of (sometimes abstract symbolic) 
objects to sets, which is the fundamental basis of concatenation. Conversely, sub-
traction or removal of objects from a set could be seen as akin to the delete oper-
ation; the ability to subtract has also been shown in pigeons. This and a number 
of other studies showing that primates, rats, and birds can both count and add 
with a fair degree of precision are summarized in Gallistel & Gelman (2005). 
 
 
6. Approaching Phonology from Below 
 
Now that we have seen an overview of animal abilities which seem to be relevant 
to phonological computation, I would like to take the next step and briefly 
describe how we might pursue a theory of phonology which employs virtually 
nothing besides these abilities plus the input given to phonology by (morpho-) 
syntax; the theory is laid out in detail in Samuels (2009a). This work is consistent 
with the ‘bottom-up’ approach to linguistic theory which is being pursued in 
syntactic circles. While more and more structure has been attributed to UG over 
the years, with the goal of reducing language acquisition to a manageable 
parameter-setting task for a child learner (i.e., taming Plato’s Problem), this 
perspective has shifted with the advent of the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 
1995; MP), and particularly in the recent Minimalist works, (e.g., Chomsky 2004, 
2005, 2007, Boeckx 2006, inter alia). Rather than asking how much UG must 
include, Minimalists argue, we must now turn this question on its head:16                                                         
    16  In advocating for a slimmer UG, it may seem that Minimalists find their aims more aligned 
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Throughout the modern history of generative grammar, the problem of 
determining the character of [the faculty of language] has been approached 
‘from top down’: How much must be attributed to UG to account for 
language acquisition? The MP seeks to approach the problem ‘from bottom 
up’: How little can be attributed to UG while still accounting for the variety 
of I-languages attained […]? (Chomsky 2007: 3)  
 
 Such a bottom-up approach to phonology is made possible by treating the 
phonological module as a system of abstract symbolic computation, divorced 
from phonetic content, pursuing the research agenda laid out by Hale & Reiss 
(2000a, 2000b). Along with Hale & Reiss and other ‘substance-free’ phonologists, 
I seek to investigate the universal core of formal properties that underlie all 
human phonological systems, regardless of the phonetic substance or indeed of 
the modality by which they are expressed. A major theme which I explore in 
recent work (Samuels 2009a, Samuels & Boeckx 2009) is that, while phonology 
and syntax may look similar on the surface — and this is not likely to be a 
coincidence — upon digging deeper, crucial differences between the two 
modules begin to emerge. One area where surface similarities hide striking 
differences is in the comparison between phonological syllables and syntactic 
phrases. Syllables and phrases have been equated by Levin (1985) and many 
others, with some going so far as to claim that phrase structure was exapted from 
syllable structure (Carstairs–McCarthy 1999). I argue these analogies are false, 
and that many of the properties commonly attributed to syllabic structure can be 
explained as well or better without positing innate structure supporting discrete 
syllables in the grammar. In Samuels (2009a: chap. 5) I move to eliminate the 
prosodic hierarchy as well, instead arguing that phonological phrasing is directly 
mapped from the phase structure of syntax (see also Kahnemuyipour 2004, 
Ishihara 2007). This means phonological representations are free to contain much 
less structure than has traditionally been assumed, and in fact that they are 
fundamentally ‘flat’ or ‘linearly hierarchical.’ Thus, the theory of phonology for 
which I argue has fewer groupings, and fewer chances for those groupings to 
exhibit recursion or hierarchy, than most other approaches. This is true at 
virtually every level, from the sub-segmental to the utterance: I posit no feature 
geometry; no sub-syllabic constituency; no bracketing of morphemes; no pro-
sodic hierarchy. The illusion of hierarchy is created by the pervasive processes of 
chunking (recall section 3) and repeated concatenation (recall section 5):  
 
(12)   Concatenation      Chunking  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
with those of neo-behaviorists/empiricists than was the case during earlier investigations in 
Principles–and–Parameters, as one reviewer points out. However, it is important to keep in 
mind that the driving force behind Minimalism (and the present work specifically) is not to 
deny that there is innate language faculty, but rather to search for the deep organizing 
principles of language whether they be specific to that faculty or not, and to present a theory 
which is consistent with the best current understanding of human evolution. 
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 Still, nobody can deny the role of grouping/chunking in phonology: 
features group into segments, segments belong to natural classes on the basis of 
their featural composition, and segments group into longer strings such as 
syllables, morphemes, and phonological phrases. Of these last three types of 
groups, only the first is a truly phonological concept, since on my view 
phonology is a passive recipient of morphemes (strictly speaking, morpheme-
level Spell-Out domains, which often but not always correspond to a single 
morpheme) and the chunks which correspond to phonological phrases 
(determined by the Spell-Out of phases common to narrow syntax, LF, and PF).17 
 I posit only three basic computational operations for phonology, as 
mentioned in the previous section: 
 
(A) SEARCH provides a means by which two elements in a phonological 
string may establish a probe-goal relation. The search algorithm, 
adapted from Mailhot & Reiss (2007), formalizes the system of 
simultaneous rule application proposed in Chomsky & Halle (1968: 
344): “[T]o apply a rule, the entire string is first scanned for segments 
that satisfy the environmental constraints of the rule. After all such 
segments have been identified in the string, the changes required by 
the rule are applied simultaneously.”  
(B) COPY takes a single feature value or bundle of feature values from the 
goal of a search application and copies these feature values (onto the 
probe of the search).  
(C) DELETE removes an element from the derivation.  
 
 If I am correct in positing such a spare set of phonological representations 
and operations, then the research presented in the previous sections of the 
present work strongly suggests that at least the rudiments of all of the abilities 
which underlie this minimalist theory of phonology are present in other animal 
species, and in domains outside of language: That is, phonology may belong 
entirely to FLB.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
I argue that the studies of animal cognition and behavior which I have presented 
here provide evidence that Pinker & Jackendoff’s (2005) criticism of Hauser et al. 
(2002a) concerning phonology is unfounded, particularly if the theory of 
phonological representations and operations proposed in Samuels (2009a) is on                                                         
    17  Note that the model I assume is recursive in the sense that there are two types of Spell-Out 
domain, the morpheme-level and the clause-level, with the potential for several morpheme-
level domains within a single clause-level one. However, these domains come directly from 
the narrow syntax, which is totally compatible with Hauser et al.’s hypothesis that syntax is 
the source — but crucially not the exclusive domain — of all recursive structures, and that 
once syntax is available, the modules with which it interfaces may be subject to 
modification. 
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the right track. Most conservatively, we can say that — contra Anderson (2004) 
and Yip (2006a, 2006b), we have tested for the building blocks of phonology in a 
wide range of species and found that they can group objects, extract patterns 
from sensory input, perform sequential objects, perform searches, engage in 
copying behaviors, and manipulate sets through concatenation. And more 
speculatively, we might tentatively conclude that, looking at the data we 
currently have, phonology provides little challenge to the idea that FLN is very 
small, perhaps consisting of just recursion or lexicalization and the mappings 
from syntax to the Conceptual-Intentional and Sensorimotor interfaces. This is 
most plausible if phonology is as conceived of in Samuels (2009a). The human 
phonological system would be, on this view, a domain-general solution to a 
domain-specific problem, namely the externalization of language. However, 
much research remains to be done in each and every one of the domains which I 
have discussed here, and I hope that the present work will be taken as an 
invitation to delve deeper and ask the more sophisticated questions which arise 
once we identify the basic points of potential consonance and divergence 
between human and animal cognition as far as phonology is concerned. 
 Another one of Pinker & Jackendoff’s (2005) qualms with Hauser et al. — 
that the latter implicitly reject the popular hypothesis that ‘speech is special’ — 
should also be viewed skeptically. I do not deny the wide range of studies 
showing that speech and non-speech doubly dissociate in a number of ways 
which should be familiar to all linguists, as evidenced by aphasias, amusias, 
Specific Language Impairment, Williams Syndrome, autism, studies of speech 
and non-speech perception, and so on. Pinker & Jackendoff (2005) provide 
numerous references pointing to this conclusion, as does Patel (2008) with 
regards to language and music specifically (in this area the state of the art is 
changing rapidly, and the presence of a language/music dissociation is still an 
open and interesting question). But on the other hand, there is also a great deal of 
literature which shows that many species’ vocalizations are processed in a 
different way from non-conspecific calls, or from sounds which were not 
produced by animals. This is true of rhesus macaques, who exhibit different 
neural activity — in areas including the analogs of human speech centers — and 
lateralization in response to conspecific calls (Gil da Costa et al. 2004). Perhaps we 
should amend the ‘speech is special’ hypothesis: speech is special (to us), in just 
the same way that conspecific properties throughout the animal kingdom often 
are; but there is nothing special about the way human speech is externalized or 
perceived in and of itself.  
 As a final note, consider the following set of characteristics which Seyfarth 
et al. (2005) ascribe to baboon social knowledge: it is representational, discretely-
valued, linear-ordered, rule-governed, open-ended, modality-independent, 
combinatoric or concatenative, propositional, and linearly hierarchical. With the 
arguable exception of propositionality (though cf. Bromberger& Halle 2000 on 
phonemes as predicates), this describes phonology perfectly. How can we 
maintain in light of this that the core properties of phonological computation are 
unique to language or to us? 
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